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Abstract 
 
 
 
Robert Kaplan's Balanced Scorecard has played an important and welcome role in the 
nonprofit world as nonprofit organizations have struggled to measure their performance. 
Many nonprofit organizations have taken both general inspiration and specific 
operational guidance from the ideas advanced in this important work. Their pioneering 
efforts to apply these concepts to their own particular settings have added a layer of 
richness to the important concepts.  Given the great contribution of this work to helping 
nonprofits meet the challenge of measuring their performance, it seems both ungracious 
and unhelpful to criticize it.  Yet, as I review the concepts of the Balanced Scorecard, 
and look closely at the cases of organizations that have tried to use these concepts to 
measure their performance, I believe that some systematic confusions arise. Further, I 
think the source of these confusions lies in the fact the basic concepts of the Balanced 
Scorecard have not been sufficiently adapted from the private, for-profit world where 
they were born to the world of the nonprofit manager where they are now being applied. 
Finally, I think a different way of thinking about nonprofit strategy and linking that to 
performance measurement exists that is simpler that and more reliable for nonprofit 
organizations to rely upon. The purpose of this paper is to set out these contrarian ideas. 
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I. The Revolutionary Impact of the Balanced Scorecard in Business and Non-Profit 
Management 
 
For commercial, business enterprises, the Balanced Scorecard posed a significant -- even 
revolutionary – challenge. In the past, business firms had relied primarily on the famed 
“bottom line” to measure their performance. Kaplan and Norton argued that this 
essentially backward-looking financial measure was not adequate to guide strategic 
decision-making in the fast-paced world of business at the end of the 20th century. They 
criticized this common practice on three grounds.  
 
• First, they challenged the for-profit's world reliance on financial measures as the 
exclusive focus of measurement. While they agreed that the financial performance 
of the firm was the ultimate measure of the firm’s success, they went on to argue 
that measures of financial success alone would not be adequate to guide choices 
about how to become and remain financially successful. To be financially 
successful, a private sector firm had to know more than its financial results. It had 
to understand many more particular concrete things about how the firm was 
positioned, how it was operating, and how it was developing its capabilities over 
time.  For these purposes, financial measures alone were inadequate. A firm had 
to develop and use non-financial measures focusing on customer relations, 
operations, and learning to be able to plan for sustained profitability in the future.  
 
• Second, they criticized the financial “bottom line” as too backward looking to be 
of much use. They argued that instead of focusing attention on the organization’s 
past performance, the organization should develop measures that focused the 
attention of the firm on the factors that could sustain financial performance in the 
future. Indeed, the principal reason to add the non-financial measures was not to 
change the purpose of the firm (that remained to maximize profits over the long 
run), but instead to focus attention on the aspects of the organization’s operations 
that would allow it to become even more profitable in the future. 
 
• Third, since the long run success of a firm depended on its ability to imagine and 
reliably execute a value creating strategy, it was important that the measures 
developed for any particular organization be closely aligned with the particulars 
of its overall strategic vision. The organization had to be looking not only at its 
financial results, but also at the way it was executing its basic strategy, and the 
extent to which that basic strategy still seemed a viable one.  
  
 
In short, the Balanced Scorecard took a giant leap into the future for business managers 
by urging them to go well beyond their traditional reliance on the “financial bottom line.” 
It focused their attention not on what their financial performance had been in the past, but 
what they needed to do to sustain that financial performance into the future. That, in turn, 
shifted their attention from an exclusive focus on financial measures to the importance of 
developing a set of non-financial measures that tracked their success in implementing an 
agreed upon strategy. 
 
Important as these ideas were to the for-profit sector, they resonated even more 
powerfully in the non-profit world. The reasons are not hard to see.  
 
• First, for non-profit boards and managers who had long struggled to create a 
something equivalent to a “financial bottom line” for their organizations, it came 
as a great relief to have a leading business expert claim that financial measures 
were inadequate to the task of measuring business performance and guiding 
business operations. If business, with all its emphasis on financial performance, 
needed non-financial measures to complement the financial measures, then how 
much more important would it be for nonprofit enterprises to rely heavily on non-
financial measures.  After all, while the ultimate goal of business was financial 
performance, that was not true for nonprofits. Most nonprofits understood that 
their goal was to produce valuable social results, not maximize financial 
performance. Of course, nonprofits had to pay attention to their financial 
performance to ensure their viability. And, it always seemed like it might be 
possible for nonprofits to find ways of monetizing the value the social results they 
produced. (Indeed, the interest in producing a true bottom line for nonprofits had 
stimulated major efforts to achieve this particular goal.) But the starting point for 
the measurement of nonprofit performance was the achievement of social results, 
and that would necessarily involve the use of non-financial measures. To be 
“authorized” to rely on non-financial measures as an acceptable way of measuring 
organizational performance allowed nonprofits to focus on their primary mission.  
 
• Second, the idea that it was important to monitor not only ultimate results, but 
also the state of relationships and processes that could be expected to lead to the 
desired ultimate results was also important to nonprofit organizations. After all, 
most nonprofits lived in a world where the results they sought were both 
uncertain, and far into the future. This fact left them in an awkward position. On 
one hand, if they stayed true to the principle that they ought to measure only 
ultimate results, they would have to wait a long time for the results to appear. 
That made it difficult for them to make themselves accountable to those who had 
entrusted them with assets in the short run. It also made it difficult for them to 
hold their own managers accountable for a result that was so far in the future. On 
the other hand, if they measured intermediate processes, while they could create 
some kind of accountability, they could not be sure that they were actually 
producing the social results that justified their existence. When Kaplan and 
Norton explained to business that they had to monitor both intermediate processes 
  
(through non-financial measures), and ultimate results (measured through 
financial measures), they simultaneously encouraged nonprofit managers to 
measure both intermediate processes (measured through non-financial measures) 
and ultimate results (also measure through non-financial measures).  
 
• Third, the idea that measurement systems should be closely tied to the execution 
of a particular forward looking strategy for creating ultimate value also resonated 
strongly in the nonprofit world. Nonprofit entities were learning about the 
importance of having an explicit “logic model” or “value proposition” that would 
establish the link between their own activities and the results they were trying to 
achieve now and in the future. They increasingly thought of this as a “strategy” of 
value creation they were trying to pursue. The idea that they should measure 
intermediate results as well as ultimate outcomes forced them to think more 
explicitly about these connections. Indeed, it seemed obvious that once they had 
worked out their particular theory or strategy of value creation that they would 
also then have identified some key points along the way where (non-financial) 
measures could be used to monitor how reliably they were executing the strategy 
they had agreed upon. If that strategy seemed to be succeeding, they could stay 
the course. If, on the other hand, it seemed to be faltering, they would be forced to 
learn and to change. That was far better than continuing along a path that had no 
particular logic or evidence to commend it. 
 
• Fourth, the fact that the Balanced Scorecard recommended the use of multiple 
measures that could not easily be compared or combined also offered some 
welcome relief from the idea that nonprofit organizations needed some simple 
summary statistic that could reveal their ultimate value. Instead of being forced to 
figure out how accomplishments in changing adolescent attitudes towards 
premarital sex could be evaluated against accomplishments in reducing out 
adolescent out of wedlock births, both could be measured and used in the 
evaluation of the overall efforts of a nonprofit organization devoted to reducing 
the rate at which children were having children.  
 
The fact that this discussion of ultimate goals, strategies to achieve them, and 
measurements to check on both these things could be carried on using multiple, non-
financial metrics was a huge and welcome relief to the nonprofit world. It meant that they 
didn't necessarily have to monetize the value of the results they intended to achieve. It 
meant that they would be allowed to measure intermediate as well as final results. It 
meant that they could look at multiple as well as single measures. It is no wonder that 
nonprofit firms that had previously struggled with the challenge of developing “financial 
bottom lines” took comfort in these ideas. Instead of having to twist themselves into the 
shape of a for profit enterprise, they could turn their energies to doing what they should 
have been doing from the outset: getting clear about the social results they were trying to 
produce, the strategy that they thought would be successful in producing the results, and 
measuring the extent to which they were being successful in implementing their strategy.  
 
  
It is here, however, that the more specific ideas of the Balanced Scorecard began to get 
into trouble, and to lead to confusion rather than enlightenment. The trouble comes from 
both the general categorization of the different kinds of measures to be developed, and 
with the emphasis to be given to the various families of measurements. These difficulties, 
in turn, come from not sufficiently adapting the concepts to the unique characteristics of 
the nonprofit environment. 
 
II. Problems with the Balanced Scorecard in Non-Profit Management 
 
The Balanced Scorecard (famously) argued that organizations should develop 
measures that could be fitted within four different perspectives:  
 
• the financial perspective,  
 
• the customer perspective,  
 
• the operational perspective, and  
 
• the learning and growth perspective. 
 
It also seemed to argue that these perspectives should be attended to roughly in that 
particular order. The financial perspective remained at the top of this pyramid because 
financial performance was the ultimate objective of a for-profit firm. The customer 
perspective was second because it was understood that holding on to the loyalty and 
enthusiasm of customers was a key future oriented strategy for maintaining financial 
performance. Operations and learning were third and fourth because it was here that the 
organization built value into the products and services it offered, and found ways to 
reduce costs and/or increase quality, and/or when combined with marketing and strategic 
planning, to develop new products that were important for the future.  
 
While this framework can be made to work for nonprofit organizations, several features 
seem incongruent with key aspects of nonprofit management.  
 
A. Financial Measures as a Means Not an End 
 
The most important difficulty lies in the emphasis that the Balanced Scorecard continues 
to give to financial measures of performance. True, the Balanced Scorecard argued for 
relaxing the stranglehold of financial measures on the imagination of for profit managers. 
True also, Kaplan is clear to say in subsequent work addressed to nonprofit managers that 
the “mission” of the nonprofit organization should occupy the place at the top of the 
organization’s goal hierarchy. But the shift away from financial measures and toward 
measures of mission accomplishment is less decisive than it needs to be to reflect the 
important difference between the ultimate goals of for-profit and non-profit management. 
 
The Balanced Scorecard recommended the use of non-financial measures to business 
firms not because it sought to change the ultimate purposes of the firm. It did not attempt 
  
to bring in measures of social responsibility that could “balance” the financial goals of 
the firm and social goals such as protecting the environment, or living up to 
responsibilities to communities in which they became important social, economic, and 
political forces, or ensuring fair hiring practices and good working conditions for 
employees. The whole purpose of the Balanced Scorecard was to help business entities 
do even better in maximizing profits over time. The Balanced Scorecard recommended 
the use of non-financial measures not to change the goal from maximizing profits to 
something else, but because financial measures alone could not help managers figure out 
how to sustain financial performance in the future.  
 
In the non-profit sector, in contrast, what is important about non-financial measures is not 
that they help us to understand how to make more money; it is that the goals we seek to 
achieve through nonprofit organizations are social rather than financial, and that these 
accomplishments are best measured by non-financial measures. Essentially, the ultimate 
goal that nonprofit organizations seek to achieve – the ultimate value they hope to create 
for society – is not sustained profitability, but the social ambitions outlined in their 
mission. Typically, nonprofit missions are conceptualized and denominated in terms of 
individual needs to be met, or social conditions to be brought about, or good works to be 
completed. Ordinarily, the best way to measure such things is to do so concretely: to see 
how many have been fed and how well, to see how many have been educated and to what 
degree, etc. Of course, as noted above, it might be possible to impute some financial or 
economic value to the accomplishments of nonprofit organizations by finding a way to 
measure the concrete results they have and then monetizing those concrete results. But 
that is always a poor substitute for the information about value that a business firm 
obtains when willing customers plunk down hard earned dollars to consume a bit of what 
the organization has on offer. In the common case, the best way to measure the value 
created by nonprofit organizations is by developing measures of their success in 
achieving their mission. That usually requires non-financial rather than financial 
measures. 
 
Note that this is not meant to imply that financial measures are unimportant to nonprofit 
organizations. Nonprofit organizations have to be as concerned about their financial 
viability – their ability to cover the costs of operating with revenues – as their private 
sector peers. Otherwise, they will pass out of existence. They also have the same kind of 
obligation (and many of the same kind of opportunities) to examine the costs of their 
operation, and to figure out how to reduce the costs without sacrificing quality in what 
they do. So, it is important for nonprofit organizations to have strong financial measures 
that can tell them about their overall financial viability, and the costs of their operations.  
 
The difficulty they have with the financial measures is that the financial measures alone 
cannot tell them whether they are creating the public value they intended to create. They 
have all the same financial information that their private sector counterparts have with 
respect to their operating costs. They also have the same financial information their 
private sector counterparts have with respect to their financial viability (i.e. their ability 
to cover their operating costs with revenues from various sources). What the financial 
measures do not tell them, however, is how much public value they have produced 
  
through their efforts. To repeat, their goals are social goals, not financial ones. Their 
value is not measured primarily by the willingness of customers to plunk down money to 
consume the goods and services they offered. It is measured instead by non-financial 
measures consistent with their social mission. For the Balanced Scorecard to keep the 
financial measures at the top of the list of things to measure is, from the point of view of 
the nonprofit manager, to treat what should be the means to an end (financial solvency to 
sustain public good production) as the end in itself (financial profitability). It is also to 
distract attention from the urgent task of being clear about what the organization means to 
produce, and how to measure that in a reliable and effective way. 
 
The important difference betweens for-profit and non-profit managers’ use of financial 
and nonfinancial measures can be described in the following simple aphorism: For profit 
managers need non-financial measures to help them find the means to achieve the end of 
remaining profitable. Nonprofit managers, on the other hand, need non-financial 
measures to tell them whether they have used their financial resources as effective means 
for creating publicly valuable results. These are two very different ideas about why non-
financial measures of performance are important, with importantly different implications 
for how non-financial measures are developed and deployed in the two different kinds of 
enterprises.  
 
B. Third Party Payers and Upstream Customers 
 
A similar problem arises with the emphasis given to customers in the Balanced 
Scorecard. Again, it is not surprising that a commercial enterprise would see the 
satisfaction of customers, and the relationship that the firm has with its customers as an 
important relationship to monitor as it tries to find and stay on a value-creating course. 
Customers are important to a private firm both as a practical means of surviving and 
remaining profitable, and as an important part of the social justification of the firm’s 
activities. It is the customers’ continued willingness to buy a company’s products that 
allows a company to survive and succeed. It is the customer’s decision to buy a product 
or service that sustains the claim that the organization is creating something valuable for 
society.  
 
The difficulty in applying this concept to the nonprofit world, of course, is that it is by no 
means clear who the important “customers” of nonprofit organizations are. Of course, if a 
nonprofit organization is providing a service of some kind to individuals, and if those 
individuals are paying a (more or less subsidized) price for the service, nonprofits have 
customers who resemble customers in the for-profit world quite closely. Just as in the 
private sector, the existence of customers who pay for the products and services supplied 
by non-profits solves a (larger or smaller) part of the problem of staying alive and 
profitable as a firm. And, it is their interest in consuming the product that provides part of 
the social justification for the nonprofit’s activities.  
 
Even if a nonprofit firm is providing beneficial services to individuals who pay nothing 
for the good or service being provided, we might still say that the clients of the enterprise 
are essentially “customers.” After all, they are the ones who get the service and benefit 
  
from it, and they are where we expect to see customers – “downstream” in the production 
process where the work of the organization finally achieves its purpose. 
 
Yet, it should be clear that all nonprofit organizations have a different kind of “customer” 
than the ones who buy their products and services, and/or benefit from the work of the 
organizations. Generally speaking, most nonprofits have some third party payers that 
cover some portion of the costs of producing the goods and services that the organization 
delivers. Those third party payers typically include both charitable donors of various 
kinds, and government. If nonprofits did not need or have a third party payer – if they 
could support their activities entirely through sales to willing customers --  then they 
would not have to be a nonprofit firm. They could operate successfully as a for-profit 
entity. The only reason for a nonprofit firm to exist is if there is some social value that is 
to be produced that cannot be covered by a revenue stream generated by willing and 
financially able customers.  
 
If there is always a third party payer of some kind in a nonprofit enterprise, then it 
becomes important for nonprofit organizations to focus on these “upstream customers” 
who contribute resources as well as those that they meet “downstream” at the production 
end of the organization. The upstream customers – the donors who contribute to the 
cause, the government that agrees to pay for services to particular clients or to achieve 
particular social outcomes through the activities of the nonprofit organization – are 
certainly practically important to the nonprofit organization. If they don’t put their money 
into the nonprofit organization, it will cease to exist.  
 
But these entities are also normatively important to nonprofit organizations since 
satisfying the expectations and demands of these contributors and contractors is an 
important moral and legal obligation of the nonprofit organization. They are the ones who 
as both a practical and a normative matter get to arbiter the value of what the nonprofit 
organization produces. Of course, the donors and the government may say that the 
important goal of the nonprofit organization is to satisfy a particular group of clients that 
they deem deserving of their assistance. But it is often true that both donors and 
governments want something different (or more) than the satisfaction of the clients the 
nonprofit organizations serve. Often, they want to achieve social outcomes by helping 
particular clients. They support job training programs not only to help particular 
unemployed workers get jobs that would make them happy, but also to reduce aggregate 
unemployment and redeem the broader social objective of ensuring equal economic 
opportunity for all. They support drug rehabilitation efforts not only to help individual 
drug users escape the trap of addiction that has ruined their lives, but also to reduce crime 
and enhance security in the communities in which the drug users live. Insofar as these 
“upstream customers” pay for social outcomes as well as the satisfaction of individual 
clients, they become important customers for social results rather than individual 
products and services. Exactly how to keep such clients happy differs from the task of 
sustaining the loyalty of those who buy products and services in the private sector. 
 
  
 
  
C. Partnerships Rather than Competitive Advantage 
 
There is one last distorting element of the Balanced Scorecard that is important to note. 
Implicit in the conception of the Balanced Scorecard is a particular view of what should 
drive the overall strategy of an organization; namely, that organizations succeed by 
adopting a “competitive strategy” that makes the best use of the “distinctive competence” 
of the firm. The challenge facing an organization’s management team is to find a way to 
develop and exploit a competitive advantage with other firms so that it can capture and 
hold onto a significant share of the markets in which they are operating. Indeed, it is this 
perspective that provides the focus the two “internal” measures of the organization’s 
performance: the operational perspective, and the learning and growth perspective. It is 
by paying close attention to operations – including opportunities to enhance quality and 
productivity – that firms can maintain their competitive edge in existing markets. It is by 
adopting a learning and growth perspective (combined with a sure sense of what 
customers want) that can allow firms to spot and exploit emerging opportunities in the 
market where they can enjoy a competitive advantage. 
 
Again, insofar as these perspectives focus the attention of nonprofit organizations on their 
internal operations, and the adaptations they can make to changing technologies and to 
changing market demands for their products and services, these measures are welcome in 
the nonprofit as well as the for profit world. The difficulty with these concepts in the 
nonprofit world is less in the importance of developing these measures, than in the 
motivation that justifies them. More specifically, for most nonprofit organizations a deep 
question exists as to whether their goal is to develop a competitive advantage in the 
markets in which they are operating vis-à-vis other nonprofit organizations, and to 
capture and hold onto a significant share of the market; or whether their goal should be to 
strengthen the industry as a whole by widely sharing their ideas about what works, and by 
encouraging as many other firms to enter the industry as possible. 
 
Of course, we all understand that, as a practical matter, nonprofit organizations are 
importantly competitive with one another. This is particularly true when they are trying to 
persuade donors and governments that their approach to a given problem, and that their 
capabilities for dealing with a particular problem are superior to their “competitors.” 
Such arguments increase the likelihood that they will attract the lion’s share of donations, 
or win the competition for the government grant or contract. 
 
Yet, as a normative matter, we also want nonprofit organizations to co-operate with one 
another when it comes to dealing with the social problems they are trying to solve. The 
reason is partly that the social problems they confront are typically very large relative not 
only to the resources of a single nonprofit organization, but also relative to all the 
nonprofit organizations working on that particular problem. Since the resources are 
typically so small relative to the size of the problem, it often seems silly for the leaders of 
these enterprises to spend much time and effort squabbling among one another about who 
should have the pre-dominant role. It seems much more appropriate for the organizations 
to sit down and pool their combined resources to see how they can make the greatest 
combined contribution to the solution of the problem they embraced. Moreover, precisely 
  
because the goal of nonprofits is to achieve social results without worrying too much 
about earning financial or material rewards for doing so, it seems that nonprofit 
organizations should be willing to set aside their narrow interests in protecting their 
organization’s competitive position for the broader purposes of achieving the desired 
results. Instead of seeing other firms in their market as competitors, then, they should see 
them as partners and collaborators in dealing with a problem to which all are committed 
to solving, but for which none has the only answer, or the only needed capacity. 
Nonprofit firms that develop good approaches to dealing with a problem should, in 
principle, be willing to give that new technology away to other firms who want to work 
with it rather than hold it as an asset that gives them a competitive advantage in their 
industry. 
 
These observations suggest that when one is using the Balanced Scorecard to examine an 
organization’s performance from either the operational or the learning perspective, it 
might be important to change the unit of analysis from the organization itself, to the 
industry as a whole in which the organization is operating. It may be important for a 
nonprofit organization to think of itself as having responsibilities for strengthening the 
industry’s overall ability to deal with problems rather than developing and holding onto a 
large market share within the industry. While it might be advantageous for the nonprofit 
firm to develop and exploit a distinctive competence in terms of its own survival and 
growth, that survival and growth could come at the expense of achieving the social goals 
to which it was originally committed. The alternative would be to co-operate with other 
firms in a combined effort to deal with a social problem that was beyond the capacity of 
any single organization to achieve. 
 
 
III. An Alternative: The “Public Value Scorecard” 
 
An alternative way of developing a useful method for measuring nonprofit performance 
would be to take all the important wisdom offered by the idea of the Balanced Scorecard 
– that non-financial measures are important, that process measures are important as well 
as outcome measures, that a measurement system ought to support the execution of an 
agreed upon strategy – but to put this wisdom to work through the use of strategic 
concept that seems more appropriate to nonprofits than the competitive strategy model 
that seems to drive so much of Kaplan and Norton’s thought. The alternative strategic 
conception is one that I have elsewhere described as the “Public Value Strategy.” 
 
A. The Public Value Strategy 
 
The basic idea behind the public value strategy can be captured in a simple mnemonic 
device: the “strategic triangle” presented as Figure 1. This triangle directs the attention of 
nonprofit boards and managers to three calculations that they should make in advance of 
committing their organization to any overall strategy.  
 
The first point of the triangle – the value circle – focuses attention on the key question of 
what constitutes the ultimate value that the organization seeks to produce. In the for-
  
profit world, that value would be something like the maximization of shareholder wealth, 
or sustained profitability – goals that can be captured quite well in financial terms. In the 
nonprofit world, however, the value that is to be produced usually involves social 
objectives such bringing relief to distressed humans, or altering social conditions in some 
important way, or producing some important public work that can be enjoyed by all. 
These goals cannot typically be usefully summarized in financial terms. They describe 
particular people to be aided in particular ways, or particular social conditions to be 
achieved through the work of the nonprofit firm. Whatever these goals might be – 
however lofty and intangible they might seem – it is important for the purposes of setting 
a strategy and successfully managing the enterprise, that these goals be explicitly stated 
and defended as important social goals to pursue. 
 
The second point of the triangle – the legitimacy and support circle – focuses attention on 
those “customers” we described above as “upstream customers” or “third party payers.” 
Again, if nonprofits were just like for-profit entities, we might not need to have a 
legitimacy and support circle in our strategic calculation. Virtually all of the financial 
support and much of the social legitimacy of a for-profit firm comes from delivering 
products and services that individual customers are willing to buy. The fact that they put 
down their money to buy the provides both the financial resources the firm needs to stay 
in business, and assures us that these individuals value the produce and service – thereby 
conferring some kind of legitimacy on the enterprise as well as guaranteeing its survival. 
But nonprofits are not just like for-profit entities. They receive donations of various kinds 
from third party payers who do not benefit directly from the operations of the firm. They 
are provided with grants or hired by government to produce results that the electorate has 
asked them to achieve. Presumably, they earn these revenues by promising the donors 
and government something that they want – some kind of public value rather than 
financial returns. Depending on what public value they intend to produce, donors and 
governments can either show up to support them or not, just like regular customers in the 
for-profit world. The important difference is that the value they get is a social value that 
aligns with their purposes rather than a private financial return that comes from selling a 
product or service well above cost.  
 
Because these third party payers are important, and because their support essentially 
constitutes a vote in favor of the public purpose that the nonprofit organization is 
producing, it is important in thinking about strategy in the nonprofit sector that we think 
about where the legitimacy and support from the enterprise will come as well as the value 
that will be produced. A nonprofit cannot simply assume that if it produces something of 
public value that either financial support or legitimacy will be forthcoming. It has to earn 
its standing not just in the community of consumers, but also in the community of donors 
and governments that are pursuing various public purposes. 
 
The third point of the triangle focuses attention on “operational capacity” – the question 
of whether the enterprise has the ability to achieve the desired goals. Note that the 
concept is “operational capacity” not “organizational capacity.” The reason is the point 
made above: namely, that when nonprofit organizations are trying to achieve social 
outcomes, they often need assistance from other organizations to help them. They are 
  
rarely large enough to accomplish important social goals all by themselves. They need 
other entities in their “industry” to act as partners, or collaborators, or co-producers of the 
desired results. This means that nonprofit organizations must often face important choices 
about how much of their resources to expend on themselves, and how much to use in 
mobilizing contributions from other organizations with whom they might work to 
accomplish their shared goals.  
 
The three points of the triangle have been represented here as important calculations that 
responsible boards and managers should make when conceiving a sustainable, value 
creating strategy for a nonprofit organization. Inevitably, these calculations also become 
the focus of measurement systems used to monitor the execution and the success of the 
strategic vision. Just as Kaplan and Norton suggest the use of measures that explicate the 
financial perspective, the customer perspective, the operational perspective, and the 
learning and growth perspective, I am advocating the use of a set of measures that 
explicate the public value perspective, the legitimacy and support perspective, and the 
operational capacity perspective. Some ideas about what these measures might be are 
presented below. 
 
 
B. Recognizing Public Value in Nonprofit Organizations 
 
The key feature of the measurement system that focused on "value" would be some kind 
of pyramid of values, goals, and objectives that would allow the organization to 
recognize (in an accounting sense) the extent or degree to which it was achieving its 
intended mission. Often, this pyramid of values, mission, goals, and objectives turns out 
to be difficult to construct. The reason is that it is not clear how one moves from a very 
abstract, general idea of the organization's mission (e.g. to promote the welfare of 
mankind) to more concrete and specific objectives that are more easily observable and 
measurable (e.g. deliver nutritious food to a particular village that has been hit hard by 
famine.) The relationship between the most general ideas that define the overall mission 
of an organization on one hand, and the more concrete, particular goals or objectives that 
serve to provide more specific operational guidance to the organization, and make it 
possible to hold an organization accountable for performance on the other, can be 
variously understood.  
 
One possibility, for example, is that the general ideas of mission define the "ends" of the 
organization (i.e. the valued results), while the more particular goals and objectives 
describe the "means" the organization relies upon to achieve the desired results.  A handy 
way to think about this conception is that there is some kind of "value chain" or "logic 
model" that specifies the relationship between desired outcomes on one hand, and the 
resources, processes, activities, and outputs that are required to achieve the desired 
results.. 
 
For example, one can say that the mission of the organization is to "improve the health of 
children." Important means to that end include: 1) ensuring the nutrition and general 
health of pregnant women; 2) effective immunization against childhood disease; and 3) 
  
regular physicals infants and toddlers. Each of these is a means to the end of ensuring the 
health of children. Each of these activities, in turn, has its own technical, operational 
requirements. To ensure the nutrition and general health of pregnant women, we would 
have to develop some methods for getting in touch with these women, and some method 
of working with them to ensure that they kept their health and nutrition up. To provide 
effective immunization, we would, once again, have to have some means for getting in 
touch with the children who needed to be immunized, and some means for delivering the 
immunizations safely and inexpensively. And so on. 
 
The point is that we understand the relationship between our ultimate mission and our 
sub-goals and objectives in terms of an ends/means logic: the mission is the end, the 
goals and objectives specify the means for achieving the desired end. Figure 1 presents a 
graphic illustration of this idea. In this conception, the logic that links mission to goals 
and objectives is a causal theory that claims that if we engage in a particular set of 
activities we will, in fact, achieve the desired result. That theory, of course, is open both 
to skeptical reasoning in advance of real evidence, and to more or less rigorous empirical 
testing. 
 
A slightly different idea is that the important relationship between broad mission on one 
hand, and more narrow goals and objectives on the other is that the broad mission 
describes the most comprehensive and ambitious purposes of the organization, while 
goals and objectives define results that represent a subset of the organization's most 
ambitious goals. For example, we may have as our mission the protection of the health of 
children. We understand that in order to achieve this goal, we might have to provide 
services to support maternal health, provide immunization and good medical care for 
kids. Further, that we would like to do this not only for the kids in Delhi, India, but also 
for the kids throughout India, or Asia, or the world.  
 
If we provide immunization to 1,000 kids Delhi, we can say that that is a contribution to 
the overall mission. But it is a contribution in two slightly different respects. On one 
hand, insofar as the immunizations have a positive effect on the heath of the kids in 
Delhi, we can say that we have found an effective means for accomplishing our objective. 
On the other hand, insofar as our target population ultimately includes all the kinds in the 
world, we can say that we have made a contribution toward the goal of ensuring the 
health of children by accomplishing that goal (more or less completely) for a segment of 
the population that we were trying to reach. This is en route to achieving our goal, but it 
is on a path that reaches the ultimate goal by increasing the scale of the effort, not finding 
an effective means. The relationship between the larger mission and the smaller goals and 
objectives is one of addition and aggregation; not means and ends. If we did exactly the 
same thing in all the cities of the world, we would say that we had achieved our ultimate 
mission.  
 
A third idea is that the relationship between the broad, general mission on one hand, and 
narrower goals and objectives can also be understood as a move from "long term" goals 
to "short term objectives." In this formulation, one could say that the broad goal was to 
reduce infant mortality rates across the world by 20% over the next ten years. The short-
  
term goals might include things as increase inoculations against measles in South Africa 
by 200% in the next year, or develop a new milk substitute that could nourish infants 
whose mothers had died shortly after their birth. Here, the pyramid of goals and 
objectives includes the idea that lower level ideas are means to the end, but they are also 
understood to be things that can be accomplished in the short run versus the long run. 
 
Finally, the move from the broadest ideas to more specific, concrete and measurable 
ideas as a move from an abstract concept, to a specification of what we mean by the large 
idea. Thus, for example, one could move from the idea of promoting children's health to 
the idea that the goal was to reduce deaths before age 5, or to reduce days lost from 
school, or to ensure that children had their eyes tested and their vision corrected with 
glasses. In this case, we are describing what we mean by children's health in more 
specific and detailed terms. The narrower goals and objectives are constitutive of the 
larger mission. 
 
Obviously, there is much to be said about efforts to construct the pyramids of missions, 
goals, and objectives that capture at a conceptual level the value that nonprofits are trying 
to produce, and the specific performance measures that will allow us to measure the 
extent to which they are achieving their goals. For example, it is now the conventional 
wisdom among those giving advice to those creating performance measures in the public 
sector that a good performance measurement system would be one which focused 
attention on a small number of outcome measures. I think there are lots of reasons to 
doubt the wisdom of that advice. 
 
I, for one, would not be inclined to take the advice that there should only be few 
measures. The reason is that I think that most organizations produce quite a large number 
of important effects on society -- some good, some bad. It seems important for strategic 
management purposes that we be alert to a large number of possible effects, including 
those that are unintended. Otherwise, we risk optimizing performance on a narrow set of 
objectives and producing losses along dimensions that were not measured.  
 
Similarly, I would be wary of relying only on outcomes. The reason is that while it is 
extremely valuable to have information about outcomes, the systems that capture reliable 
information about the outcomes of nonprofit efforts are usually not particularly helpful in 
managing organizations in the short run. The efforts to measure outcomes are too 
expensive and too slow to provide comprehensive, fast feedback about how an 
organization is performing. It is important to measure performance with respect to 
outcomes, of course. How else could an organization know if it was achieving its ultimate 
goals. But it would be wrong, I think, to limit performance measurement to outcomes, 
because that robs nonprofit managers and overseers of the information they need to hold 
the organization accountable on a real time basis. Nonprofit managers are probably going 
to need a mix of outcome, output, process and input measures to allow them to recognize 
value in what they are doing, and find ways to improve their performance. 
 
 
 
  
C. Gauging Legitimacy and Support for Nonprofit Missions 
 
The second circle of the "strategic triangle" focuses attention on the sources of legitimacy 
and support for nonprofit enterprises. The implicit claim is if nonprofit managers are to 
keep their attention focused on both the overall success and sustainability of their 
strategy, they have to develop and use measures that monitor the strength of their 
relationship with financial supporters, and public legitimaters and authorizers as well as 
those that record their impact on the world. This information is as important to nonprofit 
organizations as customers would be to a for-profit entity.  
 
For many purposes, it is useful to keep the ideas of legitimacy and support together. After 
all, the more legitimacy an organization has in the eyes of the world, the better its 
chances of raising money, attracting volunteers, and enjoying the kind of deference and 
trust that will allow it to operate relatively autonomously in the world. And, it is 
important to keep in mind that the sources of legitimacy and support often come from all 
stakeholders, not just clients, and not just donors. Yet, for purposes of constructing a 
public value scorecard, it is probably useful to break this big idea into smaller bits that 
can be measured.  
 
For example, it is obviously important for INGO's to focus on sources of revenue, and the 
state of their relationships with those who provide financial revenues to the organization. 
Many INGO's have multiple sources of revenue. They have charitable donors. They have 
members or regular contributors. They have government financial supporters. And they 
sometimes have paying customers for some of their operations. Some organizations may 
even have endowment income, or income generated from investments through effective 
cash management.  In addition, there are many nonprofits that rely not only on financial 
support from individuals, but also other material contributions such as time, tissue, and 
material. The American Red Cross, for example, could not operate without a sustained 
flow not only of financial contributions from financial supporters, but also a flow of time 
from their volunteers, and a flow of blood from unpaid blood donors. Money might well 
be the most valuable resource contributed by supporters and donors, simply because it is 
the most fungible, and requires the least work to make it fit the ultimate purposes of the 
organization. But it would be a great mistake to ignore the importance of both volunteer 
time and material contributions to many nonprofit organizations. 
 
In principle, one can imagine constructing a set of performance measures that monitor 
how well the organization is doing in raising financial revenues and other material 
resources from these different sources, and in maintaining satisfactory relationships with 
the contributors. One way to think about this would be to imagine that each of the sources 
of revenues constitutes an "account" that the organization is trying to maintain or further 
develop further. The "accounts" could be ordered in terms of their size and strategic 
importance to the organization.  The larger ones attended to more closely than the smaller 
ones. Performance objectives could be set with respect to each account just as they are for 
private sector firms. The entire set of accounts could be monitored to determine whether 
it was expanding or contracting; whether it was becoming more or less concentrated; and 
whether the substantive or political focus of the set of accounts was changing over times 
  
in ways that did or did not align with the long run strategy of the organization. The entire 
set of accounts could also be examined in light of who was not present in the set of 
accounts who might be recruited to support the organization financially and materially. In 
some sense, as the set of accounts grew larger, more loyal and more generous, one could 
say that the potential of the organization to achieve its mission would be increasing.  
 
One further point is worth making about the measurement of the quality of the 
organization’s relationship with those who contribute their money, their time, and their 
property to nonprofit organizations. The most natural way for nonprofit mangers to think 
about their relationship to financial and material supporters is to think of them primarily 
as means of achieving the nonprofit mission; not as an end in itself.  In this conception, 
the ultimate ends of the nonprofit organization lies in the achievement of its mission. All 
the value of the organization lies "downstream" in its production processes at the delivery 
end of the organization rather than "upstream" where the organization raises resources to 
pursue its objectives. 
 
It is worth noting, however, that the efforts to attract financial support from contributors -
- particularly charitable donors -- could be understood as an end as well as a means of the 
organization. In this conception, there are many private individuals throughout the world 
who are looking for a particular product and service that they value. This particular 
product and service is an opportunity for them to give their money to causes in which 
they believe. Their aims can be largely expressive: they simply want to align themselves 
with an organization that stands for a particular set of values, and enjoy the experience of 
standing with like-minded persons. Or, they can have instrumental aims that are linked to 
helping particular individuals, or establishing particular relationships with other human 
beings in much different social circumstances than themselves, and be glad to find an 
organization that can deliver their assistance and construct the relationship in an efficient 
way. Or, they can have instrumental aims focused on trying to alter aggregate social 
conditions in the world, and be glad to find an organization that can parlay their small 
contribution into a larger social effect.  
 
The point is that in each of these cases the donor is getting some significant value out of 
the transaction, and that this value exists somewhat independently of the achievement of 
the desired goals at the production end of the organization. Of course, I don't want either 
to demean the motivations of the givers by suggesting that they don't really care about the 
ultimate impact, and are giving only for the "selfish" reason of feeling good about 
themselves. Nor do I mean to diminish the fiduciary responsibility that a nonprofit 
organization has to its donors to find efficient and effective means of using their 
contributions to achieve the desired results. I am simply pointing out that in any full 
accounting of the value produced by nonprofits, we would have to include the satisfaction 
that the donors found in being able to contribute money to a purpose that they cared 
about. Having organizations to meet this kind of human aspiration seems at least as 
important as having organizations that can meet the demand for sweet smelling soap. 
And, if the customer satisfaction with the purchase of sweet smelling soap counts as a 
part of enhanced social welfare, then the donor satisfaction in finding a way to satisfy his 
or her desire to help should count as well -- above and beyond the impact that the 
  
donation has on either the clients or states of the world that the nonprofit entity is trying 
to affect. 
 
In addition to financial and material contributions to nonprofit organizations, a public 
value scorecard would also focus attention on what might be considered the flow of 
authorizations or political legitimation that nonprofits receive that allow them to operate, 
or to have important political influence with those they seek to influence. In constructing 
a performance measurement system for political authorization and legitimation, it might 
be useful to think of the organization as having a set of accounts with those who provide 
“licenses to operate” or “vouch for the organization with other players” as well as those 
that provide material and financial resources. That set of accounts would include all those 
from whom the organization was receiving financial and material contributions for the 
simple reason that their material contributions represent enthusiasm for the cause as well 
as material resources 
 
Beyond the material contributors, however are other "accounts" that are important 
because they affect the nonprofits’ formal or informal authorizations to act, or their 
overall public legitimacy and reputation. This includes government chartering 
organizations. It may also include government taxing authorities. It may even include 
accounting organizations, or accrediting organizations, or other professional peers who 
talk about the performance of the organization. The set of “legitimating accounts” would 
also include the media that covers the nonprofit and its activities, and any rating agencies 
that came into existence that provided rankings of a nonprofits performance. What is 
needed from these accounts is not a flow of material resources, but instead a flow of 
“good will” or enthusiasm for the nonprofit. The more of this the organization has, the 
easier it will be for it to raise funds, to attract volunteers, to exercise effective leadership 
in the industry of which it is a part, and to act independently and creatively on behalf of 
its goals. Just as in the case of the set of accounts representing material supporters, it 
would be important for a nonprofit organization to evaluate both the quality of its 
relationship with individual accounts, and to see the shape and character of the overall set 
of accounts.  
 
D. Measuring Operational Capacity 
 
The third component of the strategic triangle directs a non-profit board or manager’s 
attention to what is described as "operational capacity." This is the apparatus that 
converts the political authorization and the fungible material resources provided to the 
organization into important results in the world; in essence, the technologies that convert 
inputs into outputs, and outputs into satisfied clients and desired outcomes.  
 
Figure 2 presents a schematic diagram of the “operational capacity” of a nonprofit 
organization in the form of a “value chain.” The idea of a value chain is that there is some 
kind of process that converts the fungible inputs the organization receives from its 
“authorizing environment” to a set of outputs.  (An output is defined as the set of 
activities and transactions that the organization produces right at its boundary.) The value 
chain also identifies the particular processes and activities it now relies upon to produce 
  
its outputs. As Figure 2 illustrates, all these steps are either internal to the organization, or 
right at the boundary of the organization, and therefore relatively easy and inexpensive 
for the organization to monitor if it chooses to do so.  
 
But Figure 2 also shows that the “value chain” for a nonprofit organization stretches 
beyond the activities and outputs of the organization itself. Out there in the world beyond 
the organization’s boundaries (and not subject to its direct control) the outputs of the 
organization are turned into something that could be described as client satisfaction (or 
benefits) on one hand, and something that could be described as social outcomes on the 
other. Just as the ultimate value of a private sector firm’s operations lie in the satisfaction 
that is generated among consumers, so the ultimate value of a nonprofit organization can 
be measured by the satisfactions and benefits it delivers to its clients, or in the social 
results that it produces for society at large. This value is measured (imperfectly) in 
private sector organizations right at the boundary of the organization when customers put 
their money down, and reveal how much they value the output of the private entity. It is 
measured much less perfectly (and much more expensively!) when nonprofits look down 
the value chain beyond the boundaries of the organization and ask whether they have not 
only satisfied their clients, but also helped them to change their lives, and to achieve the 
social outcomes that they intended to achieve. 
 
Figure 2 also points beyond the boundary of the non-profit organization to focus on 
“partners” and “co-producers” as well as the organization itself. The reason is that in the 
public value concept, the idea of "operational capacity" is a larger idea than 
"organizational capacity." When we are looking at the "operational capacity" of a 
nonprofit to achieve its desired results, we can begin with the organization itself: the 
bundle of assets it controls, the quality of the people employed by the organization, the 
set of operating procedures and technologies it has at its command to accomplish certain 
purposes, and so on. That is what we examined first in looking at operational capacity.   
 
But most nonprofits depend on people outside the organization to help them achieve their 
goals as well. In the private sector, these outsiders would be called suppliers. In the 
nonprofit world, these outsiders are called "partners" or "co-producers" of the desired 
outcomes. In some cases, these are "partner agencies" with which a nonprofit co-operates 
to deliver aid, or build the social, economic or political capacity of their clients, or to 
achieve political goals and objectives. It might also include firms that in the for-profit 
world would be viewed as competitors since they are working in the same industry, and 
competing for the subject organization with other nonprofit organizations. At other times, 
the co-producers include the clients themselves, since these organizations cannot succeed 
without the clients taking actions in furtherance of the nonprofit goals. 
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, a nonprofit organization can spend its own resources directly to 
produce outputs that are thought to lead to client satisfaction or social outcomes. Or, it 
can spend its resources indirectly to support the effort of partners and co-producers to 
help it accomplish its goals. These efforts could take the form of packaging and 
disseminating ideas, or providing technical assistance of various kinds to partner groups. 
Or, it could take the form of developing a political environment that mobilizes other 
  
organizations to participate with the originating nonprofit in its efforts. Or, it could take 
the form of joint planning and contracting to execute specific projects that are in line with 
the nonprofit organization’s mission.  
 
The point is that one important way in which non-profit organizations can create social 
value is by “leveraging” the efforts of other organizations who share their goals, or who 
have capabilities that the non-profit can use. To measure this kind of effort, it is 
important to measure the specific activities the organization relies upon to exploit these 
partnership opportunities, and to measure the ways in which their leverage efforts pay off 
in the form of increased activity by their partners and co-producers. Indeed, there are 
some nonprofit organizations – often called capacity building nonprofit organizations – 
whose only value lies in the support they give to other direct-producing organizations. 
(These might be thought of as the functional equivalent of consulting firms in the private 
sector.)  
 
While Figure 2 gives us a conceptually rich picture of the kind of operational capacity a 
nonprofit organization might have in trying to achieve its desired social results, it has two 
important weaknesses. First, Figure 2 it seems to suggest that nonprofit organizations 
have a relatively homogeneous and standard production process: that there is only one 
thing that the organization does on behalf of its mission. The reality, however, is much 
different than this. Most nonprofit organizations are complex organizations containing 
many different activities or “product lines” which have more or less direct and complex 
relationships to the achievement of the organization’s mission. As noted above, a 
nonprofit enterprise that sought to prevent children from having children could have 
programs that were designed to encourage sexual abstinence, or the use of contraceptives, 
or information about abortion, or the development of adoption opportunities. One could 
say, then, that for each of these distinct processes or activities there was a separate “value 
chain.” Further, one could say that some part of the organization’s value chain would be 
the process that connected these various activities into an ultimate impact on the number 
of infants who were being raised by parents under the age of 18.  
 
Second, Figure 2 essentially presents a static picture of a nonprofit organization’s 
“organizational” and “operational” capabilities. It does not suggest that these operational 
capabilities might be transformed over time by adaptations and innovations made by the 
organization. Obviously, the idea of operational capacity can be viewed simultaneously 
as a fixed quantity, and as something that can develop over time. At any given moment, 
an organization has a certain set of capabilities. It knows how to do certain things. It has 
resources committed to the doing of those things. As noted above, the set of things the 
organization does can include a small set of standard activities and products, or it can 
include a wider variety of customized activities and projects. Viewed over time, the 
capabilities of an organization can change as a result of more or less self-consciously 
planned innovations and investments. It can change its scale. It can develop new ways of 
accomplishing old results. It can bring new products and services on line. 
 
It is worth noting that important innovations and adaptations can occur in many different 
ways inside organizations. Sometimes, the innovations and adaptations happen in the 
  
midst of operations as those doing the work encounter a new problem that they haven’t 
seen before. Their solution to this problem may turn out to have important implications 
for how the organization as a whole does its work. Other times, innovations and 
adaptations occur as the result of a conscious, centrally directed effort to initiate 
experiments with new methods, or with new activities. This second kind of innovation 
often is supported by investment funds of one kind or another.  
 
It is important for most organizations – but particularly those that are operating in 
particularly heterogeneous and/or dynamic environments – to be able to learn new ways 
of doing its current work, and finding new, valuable uses for the organization in society. 
As a result, they have to develop some means for recognizing the ways in which the 
organization is learning. This means having some method of recognizing when an 
unplanned adaptation or innovation occurred in the organization, working out its 
implications, and (when appropriate) spreading the new insights and technologies around 
the organization as quickly as possible. It also means that they have to have some way of 
initiating explicit experiments designed to show them how to work better, and being able 
to measure the results. 
 
This important distinction between doing well what the organization now knows how to 
do, and learning and developing overtime is picked up in the Balanced Scorecard as the 
difference between the operational perspective on one hand, and the learning and 
development perspective on the other. In the public value scorecard, we make the 
distinction between current operations on one hand, and innovations and investments to 
improve operational performance on the other. 
 
More concretely, we can say that the effective measurement of operational capacity in the 
public value scorecard typically begins with measures of organizational output. Often, 
organizational outputs are closely tied to, or an intrinsic part of what we discussed in the 
section on recognizing value in organizations. Insofar as we have constructed a pyramid 
of mission, goals, and objectives that identifies the means of achieving desired results as 
well as the desired results, we will have necessarily included some measured of desired 
organizational outputs as well as desired outcomes. This follows simply because the 
“value chain” portrayed in Figure 2 can be seen as a blown up version of the part of the 
“strategic triangle” that links operational capacity to public value.   
 
The organizational output measures should be joined by a set of productivity or efficiency 
measures. These measures check the relationship between the quantity and quality of 
output on one hand, and the costs of producing those outputs on the other. These can be 
supplemented by measures that focus on overhead or direct operating costs to offer 
assurances that the organization is operating in a lean way, and delivering a large fraction 
of its value to its clients. (This is particularly important for nonprofit organizations that 
are often evaluated primarily in terms of their “efficiency” in delivering contributions to 
clients).  
 
For nonprofit organizations, it will also be important to produce measure of financial 
integrity. By financial integrity, I mean numbers that provide estimates of how much (if 
  
any) money was lost to fraud, waste, or abuse in the operation. Again, there is lots of 
pressure to deliver resources through the value chain without having too much of the 
resources leak out the sides. 
 
A fourth measure of operational capacity that is particularly important for nonprofit 
organizations is some measure of the current state and trends in staff morale and 
capabilities. This is important in any organization. It might be particularly important in 
nonprofit organizations for the simple reason that many of the people working in 
nonprofit organizations are either volunteers, or quasi-volunteers; that is, there are many 
people working in the organization at lower than their full market value because they take 
satisfaction in the achievement of the organization’s mission. To the extent that nonprofit 
organization’s are particularly dependent on morale rather than money to sustain the 
organization’s efforts, it might be particularly important to focus attention on morale as 
something that is helping the organization succeed, and ought to be carefully managed.  
 
A fifth measure of operational capacity would focus not only on the morale and capacity 
of those who worked directly for the nonprofit organization, but also on the morale and 
capacity of those organizations that worked with the nonprofit organization as partners 
and co-producers. It is important for nonprofit organizations trying to achieve important 
social results with limited resources to see the others in their industry, and to understand 
that their aim should be to leverage their impact on the problems they are both trying to 
solve, rather than to find ways to undermine their performance to maintain their market 
share. They might want to maintain market share, but their goal has to be to build the 
industry as a whole rather than simply to hold onto the largest share of the market. 
 
Finally, measures of operational capacity should also include accounts of learning and 
innovation in the organization. Over the long run, the performance of the INGO will 
depend on the rate at which it can learn to improve its operations as well as continue to 
carry them out. The learning can be focused on how to increase productivity in standard 
activities. It can also be contained in learning how to adapt standard operations to novel 
conditions. And, it can be contained in the development of wholly new lines of activity 
and service that seem in line with mission. It can also be contained in a recognition that 
the overall strategy and mission of the organization has to be changed. 
 
V. Summary 
 
Figure 3 presents a schematic view of the important measures that would be included 
within the “public value scorecard.” As in the case of the balanced scorecard, the 
measures are aligned with important strategic ideas. Some of the measures are those we 
associate with the public value produced by the organization – the extent to which it 
achieves its mission, the benefits it delivers to clients, and the social outcomes it 
achieves.  
 
Others are associated with the legitimacy and support enjoyed by the organization – the 
extent to which “authorizers” and “contributors” beyond those who benefit from the 
organization remain willing to license and support the enterprise. These measures can, to 
  
some degree, be viewed as important because they indicate the capacity of the 
organization to stay in operation over time. But these measures can also be viewed to 
some degree as measures of value creation in themselves. This is particularly true if we 
recognize that some part of the value created by nonprofit organizations lies in the 
opportunities it affords to public spirited individuals to contribute to causes they care 
about, and another part lies in the capacity of the nonprofit organization to link 
contributing individuals to one another in a common effort to realized shared social goals. 
 
Still others are associated with the operational capacity the nonprofit organization is 
relying on to achieve its results. This includes not only measures of organizational output, 
but also of organizational efficiency and fiscal integrity. It also includes measures of staff 
morale and capacity, and the quality of the working relationships with partner 
organizations. And, it includes the capacity of the organization to learn and adapt and 
innovate over time. 
 
In the end, there is a significant amount of overlap between this conception and the 
balanced scorecard. Both believe in the importance of measurement, and particularly in 
the importance of non-financial as well as financial measures. Both believe in the 
importance of fitting the measures to the execution of a future oriented strategy of value 
creation. Both believe in the use of process measures as well as outcome measures. Both 
believe in focusing attention on learning and change as well as in current operations.  
 
Yet, there are also three crucial differences between the two concepts. First, in the public 
value scorecard, the ultimate value to be produced by the organization is measured in 
non-financial terms. Financial performance is understood as the means to an end rather 
than an end itself. The end in itself is denominated in non-financial social terms. It also 
notes that the value produced by the organization may not lie simply in the satisfaction of 
individual clients. It can lie, instead, in the achievement of desired aggregate social 
outcomes of one kind or another.  
 
Second, the public value scorecard focuses attention not just on those customers who pay 
for the service, or the clients who benefit from the organization’s operations; it focuses as 
well on the third party payers and other authorizers and legitimators of the nonprofit 
enterprise. These people are important because it is they who provide some of the 
wherewithal that the organization needs to achieve its results, and whose satisfaction lies 
in the achievement of aggregate social states as well as in the benefits delivered to 
individual clients. 
 
Third, the public value scorecard focuses attention on productive capabilities for 
achieving large social results outside the boundary of the organization itself. Other 
organizations existing in a particular industry are viewed not as competitors for market 
share, but instead as partners and co-producers whose efforts should be combined with 
the effort of the nonprofit enterprise to produce the largest combined effect on the 
problem that they are jointly trying to solve. In short, a nonprofit organization should 
measure its performance not only by its ability to increase its market share, but also by its 
ability to strengthen the industry as a whole. 
  
 
In these respects, it seems to me, the public value scorecard works better for nonprofit 
organizations than the balanced scorecard. It aligns more neatly with the ambitions of 
nonprofit organizations which is to find some way to make a valuable contribution to the 
society without worrying too much about their financial performance, or their 
competitive position. Of course, they have to be able to sustain themselves financially, 
and to do that they may have to compete to some degree with other nonprofit firms. But 
their ultimate goal is not to capture and seize value for themselves, but to give away their 
capabilities to achieve the largest impact on social conditions that they can, and to find 
ways to leverage their capabilities with those of others. 



